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Abstract 
The Fair Trade coffee initiative attempts to channel charity from consumers to poor producers via 
increased prices. We show that the rules of the Fair Trade system permit this rent to be eliminated 
due to free entry and costly excess certification of output. Using data from an association of coffee 
cooperatives in Central America, we verify that expected producer benefits are close to zero when 
we take into account the output that is certified but not sold as FT.  Our results illustrate how free 
entry undermines the attempt at extending charity via a price distortion in an otherwise competitive 
market. 
 
                                                
1 The authors are grateful to USAID-BASIS for financial support to the project, and to helpful 
comments from referees as well as seminar participants at PacDev, Paris School of Economics, 
University of Minnesota, University of Wisconsin, UC Davis, UC Riverside, UCSC, Geneva 
Graduate Institute, and the University of Padova, as well as to Tomas Rosada, Jesse Atkinson, and 
Hideyuki Nakagawa for their collaboration with implementation of the project. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Fair Trade (FT) coffee initiative seeks to channel a charitable donation to producers by 
passing a price premium to them through commodity markets.  The size of this market is huge; 
global FT sales were $7 billion in 2011 (Elliot, 2012).  The institutions that have arisen to attempt to 
perform this task are a network of non-governmental organizations operating a global regulatory 
mechanism that certifies producers and ensures that above-market prices are paid. Conveying price 
premiums to producers through a commodified supply chain is an endeavor that we expect to be 
beset by competitive pressures.  This paper suggests a simple channel through which producer 
benefits are undermined by free entry:  the certification of a larger amount of coffee than can be 
sold on the FT market.  We use detailed micro-data that allow us to rigorously quantify the net price 
benefits that the FT system has delivered to producers, and show how free entry and certification 
costs combine to dissipate producer benefits.   
FT certification is qualitatively different from other consumer certification mechanisms such 
as organic, bird-friendly, or fair labor standards because it explicitly seeks to enhance producer 
profits, whereas these other schemes seek to alter the production process used.2  Higher FT 
consumer prices are intended to translate into higher producer profits, as opposed to a certification 
                                                
2 The first sentence of the legal Suggested Fair Trade Messaging reads:  “Fair Trade Certified™ 
products directly support a better life for farmers and farm workers in the developing world through 
fair prices, community development, and environmental stewardship.”  The last sentence reads: “all 
farmers and farm workers benefit from premiums that allow them to invest in building their 
communities and bettering their lives.” Since this is the main objective of FT, we are analyzing in 
this paper the transfer of a rent to producers through the price mechanism and not other potential 
benefits of the FT system. 
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such as organic where higher consumer prices are necessary simply to cover the greater costs of 
producing organically.  Overseen by FLO-CERT in Bonn, certifiers ensure that producers meet FT 
standards, and producers are then entitled to transact sales under the FT rules:  prices must be above 
a fixed floor price and no less than 20¢/lb above the commodity market coffee price (10¢/lb up 
until January 2011, which is the period covered by our data).3  This mechanism appears to have been 
extremely effective in enforcing the rules of FT transactions:  prices in the market transact just as the 
FT system specifies they should, and there is little evidence of leakage or improper certification.  
Despite this, due to the absence of an overall control of the certified quantity of coffee the current 
system encourages an excess certification of supply.  Our results suggest that the effort to transfer 
rents through prices in competitive, commodified markets may be quixotic.  
 We illustrate the exact ways in which two core features of the current system--a floor price 
system and no control of excess certification--combine to undermine producer benefits.  The FT 
system offers certified producers a price floor as well as a price premium above the prevailing 
market price.  To get access to the system cooperatives must be certified, and since 2004 producers 
have borne the cost of certification themselves.  Certification confers the right to try to sell produce 
under the FT rules, but does not guarantee that they will be able to do so.  Indeed, far from the FT 
system exerting effort to control supply, the in-country certifiers who control the de facto supply are 
paid piece-rate for each certification performed, creating direct incentives towards excess 
certification. There is indeed ample room for over certification since, according to FLO (reported in 
Murray et al., 2006), the capacity of small producers who could meet the FT requirements is about 
seven times the actual volume of FT sales. As a result the fraction of certified production actually 
                                                
3 Fair Trade USA, the US certification body, withdrew from FLO-CERT as of the end of 2011, but 
maintains the same price rules.  
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sold through the FT market falls below one, and producers waste money by certifying output that 
will not be sold at FT prices.4  These features, combined with a variable and uncertain market price, 
should lead to a degree of excess certification that is increasing in the FT price premium and leaves 
expected producer benefits close to zero. 
Our empirical tests use administrative records from a large Central American association of 
coffee cooperatives, thereafter referred to as the Association. This Association is fully certified to 
sell coffee produced by its members through the FT system and yet, like the overall market, it 
manages to sell only one eighth to one fourth of its certified coffee at FT prices, depending on 
market conditions.5  We generate rigorous estimates of the effective FT premium, taking advantage 
of price data for those cooperatives whose production is split and sold on the FT and traditional 
markets.  These estimates are then combined with the cost of certification and the FT sales share to 
calculate the net benefit to producers per pound of coffee certified under the FT system.   
We confirm that the share of coffee sold through the FT system falls when the price 
premium increases, an observational correlation that is inconsistent with producer decision-making 
and is indicative of oversupply during these years.  This occurs in a manner that largely counteracts 
                                                
4  The role of entry as a form of arbitrage is closely related to the argument in Hsieh and Moretti 
(2003), who show that because of the 6% commission charged across US real estate markets, 
increases in housing prices lead to a higher number of realtors per sale while leaving wages of real 
estate agents constant. 
5 The Association has been selling organic coffee since 2002.  Organic coffee has remained stable at 
2-4% of the Association’s annual sales volume and it is all sold under the FT label.  We therefore 
cannot estimate the FT benefits for organic coffee for lack of a counterfactual, and only consider 
conventional (non-organic) coffee in this paper. 
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swings in the FT premium, leaving producer benefits low even when the floor price binds.  We find 
that at the peak of the coffee crisis (2001-03) when the FT price was 60¢/lb above a market price of 
61¢/lb, producer cooperatives received an effective premium of only 10.4¢/lb.  Applying these FT 
premiums estimated for the period 1997-2009 to the observed prices, we find that the average 
monetary benefit of the FT option over the period of our data amounted to $20-$50 per year for the 
median Guatemalan coffee grower, representing 4 to 10% of its coffee-related income.  The average 
effective premium over the years 2005-2009 (when market prices were in excess of the floor price) 
appears to have been negative, consistent with free entry in the presence of a floor price.  This 
analysis suggests that the price premiums in the FT system have largely flowed towards certifiers 
rather than producers as intended by the consumers of FT coffee. 
2.  EXCESS CERTIFICATION IN THE FAIR TRADE MARKET 
While demand for ‘fair traded’ products is clearly substantial (Elfenbein and McManus, 2010; 
Hainmuller et al., 2011), there has long been a debate as to the extent of a rent transfer under this 
system (Smith, 2009, Haight, 2007; Henderson, 2008; Sidwell, 2008).6  This study joins a recent 
empirical literature using data from producer countries to estimate benefits directly (Becchetti and 
Constantino, 2008; Utting-Chamorro, 2005; and Arnould, Plastina, and Ball, 2009; Dragusanu and 
Nunn; 2013).  FT is generally found to have moderate positive effects.  Dragusanu and Nunn use a 
fixed effects difference-in-differences analysis of FT certification in six Costa Rican cooperatives to 
                                                
6  Experiments on ‘ethical demand’ have shown that there exists significant willingness to pay for 
charity-linked products motivated not only by the desire to transfer rent but also by an intrinsic 
utility from consuming these products (Poret and Chambolle, 2007) or from the desire to be seen 
doing good (Soetevent, 2011). Consistent with this, FT coffee consumers have been shown to be 
less price sensitive than non-FT consumers (Arnot et al., 2006; Basu and Hicks, 2008). 
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estimate impacts on export prices, finding a significant but modest increase of about 4c/pound.  
Our paper contributes to this literature by estimating this price premium using detailed institutional 
data on more than 11,500 cooperative deliveries and 3,700 sales to the international market, 
exploiting split deliveries in the Association’s supply chain to achieve a rigorous control for quality 
in estimating price premiums.  Furthermore, we can use the sales of the Association to calculate the 
annual fraction of certified coffee actually sold through FT, a statistic that is not available for the 
market as a whole.   
The global coffee price  p  is highly variable, driven largely by aggregate shocks such as weather 
in Brazil.7 Being a competitive market we assume that all producers are price-takers and that coffee 
provides no rents to producers in expectation, although ex-post they will profit in some years and 
lose in others.  The current FT mechanism attempts to create producer benefits through two 
separate mechanisms, namely by providing a floor price as well as a premium above the prevailing 
market price.  The floor price pf  varies by regions of the world, and was set for Central America at 
$1.21/lb until June 2008, when it was raised to $1.25/lb. The ‘social premium’  is a separate and 
additional payment for social investment, which was originally set at 5¢/lb until June 2007 when it 
was raised to 10¢/lb.8 The price-setting rule for FT coffee is then that producers should be paid no 
less than the floor price fp  or the market price p, whichever is higher, where the reference market is 
the New York Coffee Exchange ‘C’ contract (NY ‘C’ thereafter), plus the FT social premium (FLO, 
                                                
7 We suppress time subscripts in order to simplify notations. 
8 The floor price and social premium were further raised to $1.40/lb and 20¢/lb, respectively, in 
January 2011, beyond our observation period. The social premium is intended for “investment in 
social, environmental or economic development projects, decided upon democratically by producers 
within the farmers’ organization” 
ρ
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2009).   
In order to be certified to sell through the FT system, producers must be family farmers 
organized in cooperatives that respect a “set of minimum standards for socially responsible 
production and trade” (member farm size, electoral process and democratic organization, 
contractual transparency and reporting), and the cooperative must pay the cost of certification 
inspections annually (Berndt, 2007).9 Once producers have paid the costs of certification they have 
the right to sell all of their output through the FT market but there is no guarantee that they will be 
able to do so.  We define certification of a larger quantity than can be sold on the FT market as 
excess certification, while recognizing that it is optimal in the presence of free entry.  Estimates of 
this quantity vary by year, but only somewhere between 1/2 and 1/7th of the certified output actually 
sells on the FT market.10  This arises because the current system is demand-constrained, meaning 
that the supply of certifiable output exceeds demand. This says that while producers must pay 
                                                
9 The exact rules specified on Fair Trade International and FLO-CERT websites 
(http://www.fairtrade.net and http://www.flo-cert.net/flo-cert/33.html) clearly indicate that the 
only requirements are for individual applicants to satisfy standards, and that no overall limit on the 
number of entrants or the total volume of coffee certified can be used to reject an application.  
10 See Muradian and Pelupessy (2005) and Haight (2007).  It is conceptually possible that the FT 
producer criteria could be set so tightly that the system becomes supply-constrained, at which point 
the arbitrage pressure on rents might be expected to alter fundamentally.  In this case producers 
would be willing to pay for access to the FT system, creating incentives for side-payments in 
certification and labelling that do not exist in the open access equilibrium. 
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certification costs on all of their output, they receive FT rents on only a share of that output.11  
Consider producers’ decisions if all output is of homogenous quality and each certified producer 
succeeds in selling the same share s  of output through the FT channel.12  We can then write the 
benefit of certification as: 
 
BFT = s ρ + max 0, p f − p{ }( )− c  (1) 
where c is the cost of certification per unit of output. If there is free entry to the system then the 
expected net benefit of the FT system to producers must be zero: 
E BFT⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = 0⇔ E s
* ρ +max 0, p f − p{ }( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = c          (2) 
where *s  is the equilibrium FT sales share.  An increase in the expected FT premium (whether due 
to the floor price in a bad market or due to the social premium) must be compensated for by a 
decrease in the share of FT certified coffee that can be sold on the market.  The implication is that 
the benefits of the FT system pass ultimately into the hands of the certifiers. 
This equilibrium gives rise to four hypotheses on the relation between FT prices, sales, and 
certification rates: 
H1.  The ratio of FT coffee sales to FT certified coffee will be less than one.  
                                                
11 We consider only the post-2004 period in which producers have paid certification costs 
themselves.  We are attempting to model a global FT market in equilibrium, and cost recovery in 
certification as well as full supply-side adjustment are consistent with this idea of a FT market 
operating at scale. 
12 We refer to producers in this model even though the negotiating entities are the producer 
cooperatives. 
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H2.  This ratio will move inversely to the FT premium. 
H3.  The actual net benefit to participation in the FT system will be negative in years in which the 
floor price turns out not to bind. 
H4.  Excess certification will push the effective long-run benefit of the FT system to producers to 
zero. 
H1 and H4 arise directly from the assumption of free entry.  H2 is implied by equation (2), 
and H3 will be true given equation (2) and a non-zero ex-ante probability that the floor binds.  
Because the certification decision is taken annually to cover a year’s harvest, our empirical strategy 
estimates annual nominal FT premiums and then relates these to the degree of excess certification in 
each year. 
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS.  
3.1.  Data and identification strategy. 
 The data consist of the Association’s records on all non-organic coffee acquisitions and sales 
for the period 1997 to 2009 (please see Online Appendix for details of data construction).13 Each 
year the Association procures coffee from about 100 cooperatives.  These cooperatives deliver 
coffee in small batches from September to the following May. The Association then processes and 
stocks the coffee, and sells it to international buyers in bags of 150 pounds.  Over the whole period, 
we observe 11,602 deliveries of coffee from cooperatives to the Association and 3,764 sales from 
the Association to international buyers. Each sales price is negotiated between the Association and 
                                                
13 The terminology used to characterize coffee transactions between the cooperatives, the 
Association, and international buyers is as follows. A “delivery” concerns a transfer of coffee from 
the cooperatives to the Association. A “sale” is between the Association and international buyers. 
Each sale is characterized by a shipment time, a number of bags, a price, and a quality.  
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international buyers.  Prices are driven by the future NYC price for the time of planned delivery plus 
a premium reflecting the quality of each sales lot and, when applicable, the FT social premium. The 
date associated with every sale is the shipment date. Systematic records on quality are reported in the 
sale contract.  They consist of 13 quality labels such as Extra Prime Washed, Prime Washed, Extra 
Prime, Strictly Hard Bean, Hard Bean, Small Bean, etc. 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of market prices for traditional (non FT) and FT coffee for the 
13 years of our analysis (recall the FT price should be ρ +max( pf , p) ).  The FT floor price has 
been binding for most of the 20 years since FT was established, except for 1994 (frost damage in 
Brazil), 1997-99 (droughts in Brazil), and from 2006 to 2009 (world food crisis/commodity boom).14  
Particularly during the coffee crisis of 1999-2003, FT was successful in delivering large nominal 
premiums to producers, in some cases exceeding 60¢/lb.  The average non-FT coffee price received 
by the Association was very close to the NYC price in all years. The average FT price calculated 
from the Association data tracks the FT minimum price perfectly during periods in which the NYC 
price fell beneath the floor. During periods when the NYC price rose above the floor, the average 
FT price tracked the NYC price quite closely, with some small surplus visible in average prices.  
3.2.  Estimating the annual FT premium. 
Coffee markets feature substantial premiums for high-quality output such as from Central 
America.  Incentives for high-quality producers to sell through FT should increase with the FT 
premium, suggesting that the quality of FT coffee should rise with the premium (de Janvry et al 
2013).  This creates a causal inference problem in estimating FT price premiums because the only 
clear way of establishing quality is through price, and yet we want to control for quality to measure 
                                                
14 A steady decline of international price since 2011 however is leading coffee prices to fall below the 
floor price at the end of 2013. 
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price premiums.  Fortunately, the structure of the Association provides a unique opportunity to gain 
empirical traction on this problem.  The complexity of the internal supply chain in the Association 
means that a given cooperative’s delivery may be split into different sales lots that are sold through 
different channels.  These deliveries split between FT and non-FT markets give us the best possible 
counterfactual because the exact same coffee is sold on both markets at the same time.  The 
structure of the Association also provides a good environment in which to understand the extent of 
excess certification.  Because the Association is very large and is able to sell only a fraction of its 
total output as FT (despite the legal right to sell it all) we observe the FT sales share directly in a 
large organization whose cooperatives are broadly representative of cooperatives in the region as a 
whole.15   
We start with the estimation of the quality-corrected price premium for coffee sold through 
the FT mechanism.  Our preferred specification for this analysis is to use delivery-level fixed effects, 
meaning that the annual FT premium is identified off of the deliveries to the Association that were 
split within the supply chain and sold partly as FT and partly without the label.  We restrict the 
sample to split deliveries with the same shipment month. This regression is shown in Column 1 of 
Table 1, where the units of observation are the delivery-sale pairs, and we include a dummy for FT 
sales in each year along with a delivery fixed effect.  One may be concerned that these split lots are 
selected in a way that makes their FT premium differ from overall sales, and so in Column 2 we 
analyze the data for all the deliveries from the cooperatives to the Association, including the quality 
                                                
15 The share of certified coffee sold as FT is a market-level attribute, but because the Association is 
very large and certifies all of its output as FT, it provides a reasonable estimate of this share.  Global 
certification data are not released by FLO, but we show that our estimates of excess certification 
track the few available global estimates quite closely. 
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characteristics recorded in the data as categorical variables as well as fixed effects for the cooperative 
and the shipment month.  These estimates are thus identified by the variation in prices within 
cooperative.  Finally, in Column 3 we estimate a standard hedonic price model at the sale level by 
simply including the categorical variables for the quality of the sale and the month of shipment fixed 
effect. Column 4 includes no quality controls at all and so gives the simple annual price difference 
between FT and non-FT sales in a given shipment month. 
 While quality variation was a concern a priori, in reality the estimated FT premiums are 
similar across the different specifications and samples, suggesting that the split deliveries are broadly 
representative of coffee deliveries. The estimates show that the nominal premium was quite 
significant in the years 2001 to 2004 with low NYC price, reaching an average of 60-64¢/lb over a 
market price of 63¢/lb, but falling to 5-9¢/lb over a market price of 126¢/lb in 2006-2008, even 
though the social premium in these years should have been at least 10¢/lb.  Additional 
specifications, reported in Appendix Table A2, use the NYC price in lieu of shipment month fixed 
effects, a quality index instead of categories, different subsamples, and specify the dependent 
variable as the difference between the sale price and the NYC price. Results confirm the robustness 
of these estimates of the FT premiums.   
 Next, we calculate the share of certified coffee that sold on the FT market for each year for 
the Association.  To date the literature has provided no systematic evidence on the total number of 
producers or coffee production that are FT certified.  We were able to find three estimates of the 
share of certified coffee that was actually successfully sold on the FT market during the high-
premium era: 13.6% in 2001 (Muradian and Pelupessy, 2005), around 50% in 2003 (Levi and Linton, 
2003), and 23% in 2006 (Haight 2007).16 However, given that its coffee is all certified, the share of 
                                                
16 All are from sources citing FLO’s unpublished data: Raynolds (2002), and Calo and Wise (2005). 
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the Association’s output sold on the FT market allows us to measure this quantity very exactly.  In 
keeping with hypothesis H1, Figure 2 shows that the sales share for the Association never climbs 
above 28% and falls as low as 13% at the peak of the coffee crisis. Clearly, were it facing 
unconstrained demand and an effective premium, the Association would sell no coffee on the 
traditional market.17  In Column 1 of Table 2 we show that prices for sales transacted on the FT 
market conform very closely to the rules of the system, including the social premium and staying at 
the floor level when market prices fall below that (see Appendix for details of this analysis).   In 
Column 2 we test our hypothesis H2, confirming the sales share moves inversely with the FT 
premium.  These results suggest that when the floor price is irrelevant the share of certified coffee 
sold on the FT market equals 31.6%, almost exactly the per-unit cost of certification (3¢/lb, as 
established further down) divided by the social premium (10¢/lb), as can be inferred from equation 
(2).     
The negative relationship between the FT premium and the share of coffee sold as FT is 
difficult to square with any decision that would be taken by a producer, and seems consistent only 
with a story in which supply piles into the market when the premium is high, driving down the share 
that certified producers are able to sell through the FT channel.  The Association, uniquely certified 
to sell whatever it can as FT, saw its ability to move coffee through the FT channel most constrained 
by oversupply on the global market in years of high premium.   
Hypotheses H3 and H4 speak to the net economic benefits of FT.  To calculate these we 
first take the product of the sales share and the nominal premium.  This gives the effective premium 
per unit of coffee certified, rather than per unit sold through FT.  The negative correlation between the 
                                                
17 This is what happens on the organic market. Less than 4% of the Association’s coffee was organic, 
and it was all sold under the FT label.  
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share of the coffee that the Association is able to sell as FT and the premium largely erases the 
differential average premium received across the years. This effective premium remained very low, 
never exceeding 12¢/lb while the coffee sold under the FT label carried a 60-65¢/lb nominal 
premium (see Figure 2 and Appendix Table A1).  The average effective premium over the 13 years 
of our data is 4.4¢/lb over an average NY ‘C’ price of 107¢/lb, and only 1.8¢/lb over the last five 
years, 2005-2009.  We can then use data on the size and facilities of the cooperatives in our survey to 
calculate average certification costs (see Appendix for details) and come to a figure of 3¢/lb.  This 
amount should be subtracted off of the effective premium since 2004 to give the net benefit, 
indicating that the average result of participating in the FT market has only been 2.5¢/lb for the 
whole period of observation and a loss of 1.2¢/lb over the last five years.  
3.3.  Producer welfare. 
These losses when the floor is not binding indicate that producers believe that they will in 
fact be able to exercise the FT option on at least some of their output in the event of another coffee 
crisis.18 These results are consistent with H4 (an overall very small benefit) and H3 (a negative 
benefit in years in which the floor price has been non-binding).  
 How large are these estimated net benefits of FT in terms of producer welfare?  One way of 
                                                
18 From a 2011 census that we did of all coffee cooperatives in Guatemala, 35% belongs to a second-
level association that is FT certified on their behalf, 26% to second level associations that do not 
carry the FT certification (nor are these independently certified), and 39% are independent.  Among 
these independent cooperatives 12% are or have been FT certified, bringing the total share of 
cooperatives that are FT certified to 15%.  However 11% of them cancelled their certification since 
2006, when the price of coffee was more favorable, all giving the cost of certification as the main 
reason for the cancellation.  
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assessing the welfare benefits of the FT system is to calculate the prices that the Association would 
have received under several counterfactual scenarios: 1) without any FT certification, and 2) if all 
certified coffee could have been sold at FT prices   Average prices would have been 110.7¢/lb 
without FT and 135.4¢/lb if all coffee had been sold at the FT price; the observed average price was 
115.0¢/lb. The standard deviation of prices would have been 32.4¢/lb without FT and 14.3¢/lb if 
all coffee had been sold at the FT price, while the observed value was 32.0¢/lb.  This illustrates the 
extent to which excess certification dampens the potential benefits promised by the FT price rule. 
We can also use data from the 2006 Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida (ENCOVI), a nationally 
representative household survey, on coffee producing cooperative member households. Median 
coffee sales were 2,645 lbs of unhusked (parchment) coffee, which corresponds to roughly 2,108 lbs 
of green coffee. This means that if the whole FT average effective transfer of 2.5¢/lb were 
transferred through to producers, household income would have increased by about $52.7 over the 
course of a year relative to a median reported coffee sales value of $502, a 1.5% increase over 
median annual consumption of $3500.  However, these data also suggest that producers actually 
receive around 38¢/lb for a dollar of sales, so if an analogous share of the FT premium is passed 
through, the average benefit would fall to $52.7*0.38, a gain of $20 per year (.6% of consumption).  
4. CONCLUSION 
 FT is a highly visible and widely used mechanism to try to channel benefits towards certified 
producers using a price mechanism.  Economic logic predicts that this effort to provide rents to 
producers in an otherwise commodified market will be subject to arbitrage pressures.  In this paper 
we suggest that the rent induces the certification of more output than can be sold, eroding producer 
benefit without contravening any rule of the FT mechanism.  Our estimates of the effective 
premium are composed of three basic quantities:  the nominal FT premium net of quality, the share 
of certified coffee sold as FT, and the per-unit costs of certification.  We believe that the most 
 16 
rigorously estimated part of the study is the nominal FT premium.  As for the share sold as FT, the 
average share sold as FT by our study institution (22%) is close to the average of independent 
estimates of the global sales share (26%), and a range of values for the certification costs will tell a 
similar overall story.  The net benefit from Fair Trade has only been 2.5¢/lb over the 1997-2009 
period, representing an average gain for coffee producer of about 1.5% of annual consumption We 
therefore believe that these results are informative as to global open access issues in the FT coffee 
market.     
If the current FT system is failing to transfer benefits to coffee producers, could an alternate 
mechanism do so?  One solution to the open access problem presented here would be the tightening 
of FT supply constraints via stronger eligibility restrictions.  A supply-constrained system could in 
theory generate producer rents, and yet there is an enormous extensive margin of genuinely poor 
and deserving coffee producers to choose from.  Any such label is likely to come under well-known 
forms of competitive pressure, as well as facing potential entry by alternative labeling schemes.  This 
can already be seen in the multiplication of similar labels, such as Whole Foods’ ‘Whole Trade’ label, 
Equal Exchange, and the recent resignation of Fair Trade USA from the international Fair Trade 
Labeling Organization so as to be able to ‘extend the benefits of Fair Trade to millions more farmers 
and workers’.19  Alternatively, individual buyers or roasters of coffee can elect to transact with 
specific producers at above-market prices via ‘direct trade’, but precisely because they do not exploit 
commodity exchanges these systems are likely to be difficult to scale up due to high transaction 
costs.  The logic laid out in this paper suggests that well-intentioned consumers may be better served 
by institutions that give benefits to producers directly rather than trying to transfer benefits as 
                                                
19http://fairtradeforall.com/q-and-a/making-it-happen/why-is-fair-trade-usa-leaving-the-
international-fairtrade-system/  
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product market rents. 
 
REFERENCES 
Arnould, Eric, Alejandro Plastina, and Dwayne Ball. 2009. “Does Fair Trade Deliver on Its Core 
Value Proposition?” Journal of Public Policy & Marketing 28(2): 186-201. 
Arnot, Chris, Peter Boxall, and Sean Cash. 2006. “Do Ethical Consumers Care about Price? A 
Revealed Preference Analysis of Fair Trade Coffee Purchases.” Canadian Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 54(4): 555-565.   
Basu, Arnab, and Robert Hicks. 2008. “Label Performance and the Willingness to Pay for Fair Trade 
Coffee:  A Cross-National Perspective.” International Journal of Consumer Studies 32(5): 470-78. 
Becchetti, Leonardo, and Marco Constantino. 2008. “The Effects of Fair Trade on Affiliated 
Producers: An Impact Analysis for Kenyan Farmers.” World Development 36(5): 823-42. 
Berndt, Colleen. 2007. “Does Fair Trade Coffee Help the Poor? Evidence from Guatemala and Costa 
Rica.” Mercatus Center, George Mason University. 
Calo, Muriel, and Timothy Wise. 2005. “Revaluing Peasant Coffee Production: Organic and Fair 
Trade Markets in Mexico.” Global Development and Environment Institute, Tufts University. 
de Janvry, Alain, Craig McIntosh, and Elisabeth Sadoulet (2013).  “What determines the quality of 
FT coffee?”. University of California at Berkeley, Working paper. 
Dragusanu, Raluca, and Nathan Nunn.  2013.  “The Impacts of Fair Trade Certification:  Evidence 
from Coffee Producers in Costa Rica.” Harvard Business School, Working Paper. 
Elfenbein, Daniel, and Brian McManus. 2010. “A Greater Price for a Greater Good? Evidence that 
Consumers Pay More for Charity-Linked Products.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 
2(2): 28-60. 
Elliot, Kimberly.  2012.  “Is my Fair Trade coffee really fair? Trends and Challenges in Fair Trade 
 18 
certification.”  Center for Global Development, Policy Paper 017. 
FLO. 2009. Fair Trade Minimum Price and Fair Trade Premium Table. Current version: 22.07.2009. 
Available at http://www.fairtrade.net/fileadmin/user_upload/content/2009 /standards/ 
documents/ 220709_EN_FTMP_and_P_Table.pdf. 
Haight, Colleen. 2007. “Does Fair Trade Coffee Help the Poor? Evidence from Guatemala and 
Costa Rica.” Mercatus Center, Policy Comment #11, George Mason University. 
Hainmuller, Jens, Michael Hiscox, and Sandra Sequeira. 2011. “Consumer Demand for the Fair 
Trade Label: Evidence from a Field Experiment.” MIT Political Science Department 
Research Paper No. 2011-9B. 
Henderson, David. 2008. “Fair Trade is Counterproductive and Unfair.” Economic Affairs 28(3): 62-
64. 
Hsieh, Chang-Tai, and Enrico Moretti.  2003.  “Can Free Entry be Inefficient?  Fixed Commissions 
and Social Waste in the Real Estate Industry.” The Journal of Political Economy 111(5): 1076-1122. 
Levi, Margaret, and April Linton. 2003. “Fair Trade: A Cup at a Time?” Politics and Society 31(3): 407-
32. 
Muradian, Rodlan, and Wim Pelupessy. 2005. “Governing the Coffee Chain: The Role of Voluntary 
Regulatory Systems.” World Development 33(12): 2029-2044.Poret, Sylvaine, and Claire 
Chambolle. 2007. “Fair Trade Labeling: Inside or Outside Supermarkets?” Journal of 
Agricultural and Food Industrial Organization 5(1): Article 9. BEPress. 
Murray, Douglas, Laura Raynolds, and Peter Taylor. 2006. “The future of Fair Trade coffee: 
Dilemmas facing Latin America’s small-scale producers”. Development in Practice 16(02): 
179-192. 
Raynolds, Laura. 2002 “Poverty Alleviation Through Participation in Fair Trade Coffee Networks: 
Existing Research and Critical Issues.” http://www.colostate.edu/Depts/ 
 19 
Sociology/FairTradeResearchGroup 
Sidwell, Marc. 2008. Unfair Trade. London: Adam Smith Institute. 
Smith, Alastair. 2009. “Evaluating the Criticisms of Fair Trade.” Economic Affairs 29(4): 29-36. 
Soetevent, Adriaan. 2011. “Payment Choice, Image Motivation, and Contributions to Charity: 
Evidence from a Field Experiment.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 3(1): 180-205. 
Utting-Chamorro, Karla. 2005. “Does Fair Trade Make a Difference? The Case of Small Coffee 
Producers in Nicaragua.” Development in Practice 15(3): 584-99. 
 
  
 20 
 
Figure 1. Evolution of coffee prices over time (US¢/lb) 
Note: NYC price is from the International Coffee Organization Indicator price for other Arabica 
(www.ico.org/coffee_prices.asp).  Average prices are from the Association sales data. 
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Figure 2. FT premium and share of non-organic coffee sold under FT contracts 
Note: The quality-adjusted Nominal FT premium is from column (2) in Table 1. The effective 
premium is obtained by multiplying the nominal premium by the share of coffee sold as FT.  Fair 
Trade share is from the Association sales data. 
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Table 1. Establishing the quality-adjusted annual FT nominal premium  
Estimation of the fair trade premium 
  
 
Contract price (US cts/lb) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fair trade premium 
    1997 4.73** 0.83 6.35 11.25* 
 
[1.03] [1.69] [5.21] [5.17] 
1998 22.50** 14.06** 13.34** 9.33** 
 
[1.19] [0.94] [2.68] [3.07] 
1999 10.95** 9.95** 12.58** 10.79** 
 
[0.70] [0.98] [1.51] [1.70] 
2000 20.35** 20.52** 24.07** 25.14** 
 
[0.83] [1.29] [2.80] [2.94] 
2001 61.11** 64.33** 64.47** 64.57** 
 
[0.65] [0.64] [1.08] [1.09] 
2002 52.80** 60.64** 61.96** 61.85** 
 
[3.21] [0.83] [1.26] [1.24] 
2003 53.83** 61.77** 60.43** 59.23** 
 
[1.44] [0.34] [0.67] [0.77] 
2004 45.22** 42.78** 44.16** 42.40** 
 
[1.73] [0.91] [1.38] [1.43] 
2005 2.63 4.10** 6.05** 4.89** 
 
[2.62] [0.88] [1.05] [1.14] 
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2006 6.76** 9.21** 7.70** 6.89** 
 
[1.23] [0.52] [0.61] [0.70] 
2007 9.14** 6.50** 7.23** 6.71** 
 
[1.16] [0.69] [0.86] [0.97] 
2008 3.34* 2.02** 4.93** 4.73** 
 
[1.32] [0.67] [1.18] [1.24] 
2009 2.83 12.94** 13.60** 12.07** 
 
[3.44] [1.22] [1.38] [1.46] 
Controls 
      Quality categories - Y Y N 
  Shipment month FE - Y Y Y 
  Coop FE - Y - - 
  Delivery FE Y N - - 
Observations 4,403 18,234 3,764 3,764 
Number of deliveries / coops 
FE 1,451 296 
  R-squared 0.68 0.92 0.90 0.86 
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Quality categories are: Prime-Washed, Extra Prime Washed, HB, SHB, Fancy SHB, SHB-HH, 
SHB-EPW, GAP, and Small Beans. All regressions also control for UTZ certification. 
Samples:  (1) deliveries sold partly as FT and partly as non-FT with same shipment month; (2) 
all deliveries; (3) and (4) all sales 
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Table 2. Price and excess certification in the presence of the FT floor price. 
 
 
Contract price  
(US cts/lb) 
Probability that sale is 
transacted through the 
FT market 
(coefficients x 100) 
  (1) (2) 
   Fair Trade floor price binding 
  FT * Social premium 0.91** 
 
 
[0.12] 
 FT * (FT floor price - NYC price) 0.92** 
 
 
[0.01] 
 (FT floor price - NYC price) 
 
-0.11** 
  
[0.03] 
Fair Trade floor price not binding 
  FT * Social premium 0.79** 
 
 
[0.11] 
 FT * (FT floor price - NYC price) 0.11* 
 
 
[0.04] 
 (FT floor price - NYC price) 
 
-0.02 
  
[0.08] 
   NYC price 0.98** 
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[0.01] 
 Constant 8.00** 31.59** 
 
[1.00] [1.30] 
   Observations 3,764 3,764 
R-squared 0.82 0.00 
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Observations on all sales during the period of observation 1997-2009.  The FT 
floor price is $1.21/lb until June 2008, and $1.25/lb afterwards. The social 
premium is 5¢/lb until June 2007 and 10¢/lb afterwards. The reference NYC 
price for each sale is a monthly average of the future price for the following 2nd 
and 3rd positions after the date on which the sale contract was signed.  FT is an 
indicator that the sale was transacted through the FT market. 
 
